The Second World War has reconfirmed what has been general knowledge from time immemorial: The fundamental difference between the reactionary politician and the genuine democrat is revealed in their attitude towards state power. A man’s social character can be objectively appraised on the basis of this attitude, regardless of his political party. It follows from this that there are genuine democrats among the fascists and pure fascists among the party democrats. Just as the character structure, this attitude towards state power is not confined to any one class or political group. Here, too, to paint everything in black and white colours is wrong and inadmissible from a sociological point of view. Mental attitudes and political parties cannot be mechanically equated.
It is typical of the reactionary to advocate the supremacy of the state over society; he advocates the ‘idea of the state’, which leads in a straight line to dictatorial absolutism, whether it is embodied in a royal, ministerial or open fascist form of state. The genuine democrat, who acknowledges and advocates natural work-democracy as the natural basis of international and national cooperation, always aims at overcoming the difficulties of social cooperation by eliminating the social causes of these difficulties. It is this aim that characterizes him as a genuine democrat! This requires a thorough discussion of the development and the rational function inherent in the authoritarian state. It is fruitless and senseless to fight an irrational social institution, without first asking oneself how it is possible that, despite its irrationality, this institution is capable of surviving and even appearing necessary. From our study of the Russian state apparatus we learned that this state apparatus became necessary in the course of time. And it was not difficult to see that, notwithstanding all its irrationality, it very definitely had the rational function of holding together and leading the Russian people, after the masses had failed to achieve social self-government.
We would not hesitate to call a mother’s behaviour irrational if she were to treat her neurotic child in a strict and authoritarian manner. We will readily understand that it is this strictness that makes the child sick, but we must not overlook the fact - and this is the cardinal point in the fighting of authoritarian education - that a child who has become a neurotic, and is living in a neurotic family situation, cannot be held in check in any other way than with authoritarian means. In other words, although it is not fundamentally rational, the mother’s strictness has a rational side, however conditional and circumscribed it may be. We will have to concede this conditional rational function if we ever hope to convince the educator, who adheres to the authoritarian principle from sheer necessity, that it can be eliminated by preventing the child from becoming neurotic.
This conditional and circumscribed rational character also applies to the authoritarian state, as reluctant as we are to admit it, knowing how dangerous such a statement could become in the hands of a mystical dictator. He would be capable of saying: ‘Do you hear! Even the liberal work-democrats admit the necessity and rationality of an authoritarian leadership.’ We know now that it is the irrational character structure of masses of people that offers a ‘justification’ for authoritarian leadership. Only in this way can a dictatorship be comprehended, and this comprehension is the only hope of eliminating it from man’s life. The recognition of the irrationality in the structure of the masses gives us a social basis from which to overcome this irrationality and, with it, dictatorship itself- to
overcome it, not with illusions, but objectively and scientifically. When social cooperation is disrupted, state power is always strengthened. This is in keeping with the moralistic-authoritarian method of dealing with the difficulties superficially. This approach does not of course really remove the social evil, but merely pushes it into the background, from which it later breaks forth much more violently and extensively. If there are no other means of dealing with rape murders than the execution of the murderer, then one uses this method. This is the approach followed by the authoritarian state. Work-democracy, however, goes to the core of the matter and asks: How can we eliminate the phenomena of rape and murder altogether? Only when we comprehend the compulsion of execution and simultaneously condemn it is the problem of elimination brought into sharp focus. Undoubtedly, the elimination of social evils is one of the chief means of causing the authoritarian state to wither away. In all probability moralistic-authoritarian social leadership will continue to function only so long as and insofar as it cannot be superseded by the methods of self-government. This applies to -the state in general, as well as to all other areas of social life.
True enough, the authoritarian state is essentially a suppressive apparatus, but it is not exclusively so. At the same time, and indeed originally, before it became a suppressive apparatus of the society, it was an aggregate of autonomous social relations. Originally, the state was identical with society. In the course of time it detached itself from the society and became more and more alien to it, eventually assuming the form of a raging force above and against it.
As long as there was a social organization (such as in the clan society) that was not driven by serious inner contradictions, there was no need for a special power having the task of holding the social organisms together. The nature of society is such that it requires a power to prevent its disintegration, its decline and its dissolution when it is driven by powerful opposing interests and difficulties of life. Among other things it was the schism of German society caused by the many different and hostile political parties that German fascism to achieve power. Fascism’s rapid and powerful rise to power clearly shows that, for masses of German people, the promise that the society would be held together by means of the state was more essential than the individual party programmes. But this does not change the fact that ideas and political ideologies cannot eliminate the inner schisms of society, and it makes no difference whether this political idea is totalitarian or non-totalitarian. The fascists were not the only ones who played up the idea of the state. They merely did so more urgently and more effectively than the social democratic government, the Communists and the liberals. And it was precisely for this reason that they were victorious. Thus, it is the political schism of a society that gives birth to the idea of the state, and vice versa, the idea of the state that creates social schism. It is a vicious cycle from which one can extricate oneself only if both the schism and the idea of the state are traced to their source and given a common denominator. As we already know, this common denominator is the irrational character structure of masses of people. Neither those who advocated the idea of the state nor those having other political programmes had any inkling of this common denominator. The assertion that this or that dictator imposed himself upon a society against its will and from the outside was one of the gravest errors made in the assessment of dictatorships. In reality, every dictator in history did nothing more than bring already existing ideas of the state to a head. He had merely to seize upon this idea and to exclude all non-related ideas to achieve power.
The rational and irrational dual function of the state and of the idea of the state was clearly assessed by Friedrich Engels in the last century:
Hence, the state is definitely not a power imposed upon society from the outside. Nor, for that matter, is it ‘the reality of the moral idea’, ‘the image and reality of reason’, as Hegel claimed. It is the product of society at a certain stage of its development. It is the admission that a society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, has split up into irreconcilable opposing interests, which it is powerless to cope with. To prevent these oppositions, these classes with conflicting economic interests, from consuming themselves and society in a fruitless fight, a power which apparently stands above society becomes necessary, a power which is supposed to have the function of checking the conflict and keeping it within the limits of ‘order’. This power which originates from society but, placing itself above it, becomes more and more alien to it, is the state.
This sociological elucidation of the concept of the state by the industrialist and German sociologist Friedrich Engels completely undermined all philosophies of the state, which in one way or another were derived from Plato’s abstract and metaphysical idea. Friedrich Engels’ theory does not trace the apparatus of the state from higher values and nationalistic mysticism; in a very simple way it gives a picture of the state’s dual nature. Inasmuch as it clarifies the social basis of the state apparatus and at the same time points out the contradiction between state and society, it offers the shrewd statesman - one, for instance, having the stature of Masaryk or Roosevelt - as well as each individual working man of the world, a powerful means with which to comprehend the schism of society and the consequent necessity of a state apparatus. .. and the means to eliminate it.
Let us try to elucidate the genesis of the dual nature of the state with a simple example:
In the initial stages of human civilization the social tasks of living and working together presented no problem. Hence, the relationship between man and man was also simple. We can study this factor in .the remnants of the old and simple civilizations which have continued intact into our own times. Once again let us illustrate our point with the well-known organization of the Trobrianders. They have a natural economy, i.e., a use economy. Whatever market economy they practise is of no account. One clan catches fish, another grows fruit. The one clan has too many fish and the other has too much fruit. Hence, they exchange fish for fruit and vice versa. Their economic relationships are very simple.
Besides the economic relationships there is a definite familial relationship among the members of the clan. Since marriage is exogamous, the Trobriander adolescents of one clan form sexual relations with adolescents of another clan. If by a social interpersonal relationship we understand every relationship that serves to gratify a basic biologic need, then the sexual relationship coexists on an equal par with the economic relationship. The more work itself becomes separated from the gratification of a need, whereby the needs themselves become more complicated, the less is the individual member of the society capable of fulfilling the manifold functions that fall to his share. For example:
Let us transplant the Trobriander society and its natural economy to any place in Europe or Asia. This is an admissible supposition, for all nations of the earth were formed from tribes, and the tribes were originally formed from groups of clans. In the
same way, market economy and exchange economy were developed from natural economy. Let us now assume that in one of these small communities, consisting of two to three hundred people, the need arises to establish contact with other small communities. This need is very small. Only one of the two hundred members of the community has something to tell a member of another community. He gets on his horse and rides to the other community and delivers his message. The art of writing has made a beginning and the need for social contact with other communities grows little by little. Until this time everyone delivered his own mail, but now the rider is requested to deliver several letters. In the meantime the communities have grown and now comprise as many as two to five thousand members. The need to enter into a correspondence with members of other communities also grows. Already hundreds of people are exchanging letters. With the development of commerce, the writing of letters ceases to be a rare curiosity. The delivery of letters becomes a daily, vitally necessary task, which is more and more difficult to solve in the .old way. One community discusses the matter and decides to employ a.’ letter carrier’. It relieves one of it’s, still nondescript, members from all other duties, guarantees him a definite income and charges him to take care of the community’s mail. This first letter carrier is the human embodiment of the interpersonal relationship between letter writing and letter delivery. In this way a social organ comes into being, the sole function of which is to deliver letters. Our letter carrier is a primitive type of social administrator, whose vitally necessary work is still very definitely and solely in the service of the social community.
Let us further assume that in the course of many years the primitive communities have grown into small towns of, let us say, fifty thousand inhabitants each. Among other things the growth of these communities is to be ascribed to the new function of letter writing and the social intercourse related to it. One letter carrier is no longer enough; one hundred letter carriers are needed now. They require their own administration; therefore, one of them is given the job of chief letter carrier. He is a letter carrier who has been relieved of his former duties. In place of these he has assumed the more extensive duty of organizing the work of the one hundred letter carriers in the most practical way possible. As yet, he does not ‘supervise ‘, and he does not give orders. He does not stand above the community of letter carriers. He merely facilitates their work; he decides when the letters will be picked up and when they will be delivered. He now gets the idea of producing postage stamps, which simplify the entire function.
In this way a very simple and vitally necessary function has become autonomous. ‘The postal system’ has become an ‘apparatus’ of the society; it has grown out of the society for the purpose of improving its co-ordination. It still does not set itself up against this society as a superior power.
How is it possible for such an administrative apparatus of society to become a suppressive apparatus? It does not become a suppressive power on the basis of its original function. The administrative apparatus retains these social functions, but it gradually develops characteristics other than those related to its vitally necessary activity. Let us now assume that in our large community, conditions of authoritarian patriarchy have begun to develop, wholly independent of the postal system. For example, there are already ‘aristocratic’ families, which have developed from the original tribal chiefs. By accumulating dowries, they have developed a twofold power: first of all the power that is inherent in property, and second of all the power to forbid their own children to have
sexual intercourse with the less well-to-do strata of the community. In the development of economic and sexual slavery these two power functions always go hand in hand. The authoritarian patriarch who becomes more and more powerful wants to prevent other, weaker members of the community from maintaining contact with other communities. He also wants to make it impossible for his daughters to exchange love letters with whomever they please. It is of interest to him that his daughters form relations only with certain well-to-do men. His interests in sexual and economic suppression cause him to seize upon those autonomous social functions that were originally managed by the society as a whole. On the basis of his growing influence, our patriarch will introduce a new regulation forbidding the post office to deliver all letters without distinction. Under the new regulation, for example, love letters in general and certain business letters will not be delivered. To fulfil this novel function, the post office charges one of its letter carriers with the task of ‘censoring the mail’. In this way the social administration of mail service takes on a second function, one which makes it an authoritarian power separated from and above society. This constitutes the first step towards the development of an authoritarian state apparatus from a social administrative apparatus. Letter carriers still continue to deliver letters, but already they have begun to poke their noses into the contents of the letters and to determine who is allowed and who is not allowed to write letters and what one can write about and what one cannot write about. To this the social community reacts in one of two ways: toleration or protest. The first gap in the social community has been created, whether it is called ‘class conflict’ or something else. It is not a question of words, but of the differentiation between a social function which is vital and one which curtails freedom. From now on, arbitrary practices have a free hand. For instance, Jesuits can exploit the postal censorship for their own purposes. The security police might make use of the existing postal censorship to increase their own power.
Without distorting things, this simplified example can be easily applied to the complicated machinery of present-day society. It applies to our banking system, our police and our school system, the administration of food distribution, and certainly to the bearing of society towards other nations. We begin to make order of chaos if, in the evaluation of any state function, we consistently ask ourselves what part of it relates to its original function of executing social tasks, and what part of it relates to the later-acquired function of suppressing the freedom of the members of the society. Originally, the police of New York, Berlin or any other city had the task of protecting the community from murder and theft. Insofar as they still perform this task, they are a useful and autonomous function of society. But when the police take it upon themselves to prohibit harmless games in private homes, to prescribe whether a man or woman can receive a member of the opposite sex in his or her apartment alone, to determine when they have to get up and when they have to go to bed, then we have a picture of a tyrannical and authoritarian state power, a state power above and against society.
It is one of work-democracy’s inherent tendencies to eliminate those functions of social administration that operate above and/or against society. The natural work-democratic process tolerates only those administrative functions that serve to promote the unity of society and to facilitate its vital operations. It clearly follows from this that one cannot be ‘against’ or ‘for’ the ‘state’ in a mechanical and rigid way. One has to distinguish between its original social functions and its suppressive functions. It is also clear that the state apparatus will become and will have to become the executive organ of
society when, in fulfilling its natural work functions, it operates in the interest of society as a whole. When this happens, however, it ceases to be a’ state apparatus’. It divests place it above and against society and thus implant in it the seed of authoritarian dictatorships. This constitutes the genuine withering away of the state, i.e., a withering away of its irrational functions. The rational functions are vitally necessary and they continue.
This distinction makes it possible to examine every vitally necessary administrative function to see whether it is attempting to place itself above and against society, to see whether it is beginning to become a new authoritarian instrument of the state. As long as it is in the service of society, it is also a part of society. It is desirable, necessary, and it belongs in the sphere of vitally necessary work. If, however, the state apparatus sets itself up to be the master and tyrant of society, if it claims autonomous power for itself, then it becomes the arch enemy of society and must be dealt with accordingly.
It is clear that a modern and complicated social organism could not exist without an administrative apparatus. It is equally clear that it is no easy task to eliminate the tendency of the administrative apparatus to deteriorate into a ‘state apparatus’. Here is a vast field of research for sociologists and social psychologists. After the authoritarian state has been overthrown, the task still remains of preventing administrative functions from becoming autonomous powers again. However, in view of the fact that authoritarian autonomy is the direct result of the inability of working masses of people to regulate, administrate and control their own affairs, the problem of the authoritarian state can no longer be dealt with and mastered independently of the problem of man’s structure, and vice versa.
This leads directly to the question of so-called ‘state capitalism’, which was still unknown in the nineteenth century and did not begin to develop until the First World War, 1914-18.
Copyright © 2022-2025 by Michael Maardt. You are on a33.dk • Contact